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NETWORK UNAVAILABLE: PLATFORM, PERFORMATIVITY, AND EVERYDAY LIFE DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN CONTEMPORARY CHINESE NETWORK CULTURE

Abstract

This paper problematizes assumptions of global all-pervading 'available' network culture by examining 'network unavailability' phenomenon in contemporary Chinese network culture through a post-colonial critique. The central argument of 'network unavailable' in China is contextualized by the performativity of the Great Firewall and the Golden Shield Project, Chinese media artist Fei Jun's net art project *Interesting World* (2019) in the Venice Biennale and network happenings during the 2019 Anti-extradition Law Amendment Bill protests in Hong Kong. Through these examples the author argues that network culture in China is political and geopolitical and the discussion of networks should go beyond mere structuralism and emphasize the everyday life, tactical, and microscopic decision-making process.

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> *If modern colonialism has been initiated and shaped by the West, then the postcolonial enterprise is still operating within the limits of colonial history and has not yet gone beyond a parasitic form of critique… Globalization without deimperialization is simply a disguised reproduction of imperialist conquest.* (Chen, Asia as Method: Towards Deimperialization 2)

This paper seeks to unpack and problematize assumptions of omnipresence and totality of a global all-pervading 'available' network culture by examining 'network unavailability' in contemporary Chinese network culture through a post-colonial critique.

The central research question of the paper is straightforward, that is, to understand network culture in contemporary China, that in itself may reconcile, concede, and contradict the experience of global, often 'Eurocentric,' available 'World Wide Web' network culture. To begin with, one might ask why contemporary China in the discussion of networks from a postcolonial perspective? It is generally understood that the USA and Europe are leading countries in the development of information technology and the discourse of network culture, and yet China, interestingly, has the highest number of Internet users in the world, and there are other non-EuroAmerican countries that one may overlook. In 2019, China had approximately 854 million Internet users reported by the Internet World Stats that is three times that of the USA (293 million) and eleven times that of Germany (79 millions). The top ten countries with the highest number of Internet users are China (1st), India (2nd), Indonesia (4th), Brazil (5th), Nigeria (6th), Russia (8th), Bangladesh (9th), and Mexico (10th).[1] The statistics tellingly shift our attention to the discussion of network culture informed by the user-demographic perspective and draws our attention to countries that are often called 'technologically backward' in terms of technological development. The data also allows us to depart from an Eurocentric focus, to engage the major stakeholder of network users, and expand the demographics of network users to the 'rest of the world'. What is the experience of the network for 854 million Internet users in China in comparison to what is commonly known through existing scholarly research in network culture? China is not absent from academic literature recently in network culture and media studies (for example, Schneider 2018; Li 2019; Neves 2020), but a critical perspective on the nature of its network culture will be helpful to contextualize thinking, expectations, opposite forces, and perhaps the future of network culture in China, as well as elsewhere. In this essay, as such, I take the unavailable network as the starting point of my enquiry.

In what follows, the notion of 'network unavailable' is informed by two conceptual layers. The first, the macroscopic layer, refers to the network infrastructure and platform, in this case the Great Firewall (GFW) and the Golden Shield Project (GSP) of China. The Great Firewall of China, being a gateway and a self-contained network system, in itself is conceived as a parallel universe to the Internet (Griffith 2019). This 'wall' is constructed not only to block and isolate itself from global information technology and its circulation, but to remain operational as a network infrastructure within the cyber territory of China; whereas the Golden Shield Project is the agent of the Great Firewall to execute tasks, mainly through censorship, blocking, and filtering of information from and approved by the Chinese state government and the Chinese Communist Party. In a nutshell, both the GFW and GSP demonstrate the unwillingness to partake in the 'EuroAmericentric' thus 'imperialistic' Internet model for political-economical-technological

reasons, and a withdrawal and resistance to global information circulation and global network culture.

Secondly, the microscopic layer, the notion of 'network unavailable' is addressed by artistic practices and a politics of everyday life that questions the taken-for-granted availability and openness of what network culture once promised. I draw case studies and experiences from contemporary artistic practice in China and the everyday experience, primarily the 2019 Anti-extradition Law Amendment Bill protests in Hong Kong, and through these outline key characteristics of a 'network unavailable'. These activities and practices, I argue, could be formulated as a provisional challenge, and/or resistance to network culture in China. All in all, network culture in China is not merely a matter of exclusion and protectionism, a distinction of the real and the counterfeit (or the performed), but a dialectical operation to allow us to rethink the current state of global network culture through its decolonization.

Let me briefly define the scope and terms of postcolonial studies and decolonizing technology before the discussion proceeds. In "Digital Postcolonialism" (2015), Jandrić and Kuzmanić follow Edward Said's (1993) argument and establish the concept 'digital postcolonialism' that "should start from… geographical thinking in the digital worlds… [and] consists of the dialectic between an object and its representation, a territory and its map" (Jandrić and Kuzmanić 38). The geopolitics of the digital has already been demonstrated in the aforementioned Internet World Stats (2019) example. Along this line of thinking, the conceptualization of the decolonizing technology, I argue, is to go beyond the established geographical/binary oppositions of, for instance, the West/rest, the global North/global South, the technological superior/inferior, and use the example of China, which is often not considered as a model of information system and technology, and to debunk some of the dominant discourse in the discussion of network culture in a global context. The discussion that I draw upon below aims to reveal how non-EuroAmerican network culture produces effects locally and on the global scale.

A few more contextualizations on the notion of 'network' in contemporary China network culture are needed. Firstly, I would like to stress that the discussion is not merely framed by geographical or territorial definitions but is more a 'stack' of interacting layers. Secondly, the discussion and definition of network here are not only descriptions of the age-old belief of 'guanxi', which in sociological terms is a personal social network and its associate power in the Chinese context. Rather, I see network culture in China as multifaceted in how the political-economical-technological aspects contribute to shape it. Network culture in China is informed by ideas such as nationhood, cyber nationalism, economic protectionism, and political hegemony, and practiced through information and algorithmic-ideological control. It is further complicated by the sociopolitical relationship between China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, (the Sinophone), and their relationships with the rest of the world. I would argue the notion of 'network' in China network culture is a complicity that is established by disconnection, unavailability, and withdrawal. It is imperative to discuss the configuration and influence of China's network culture and practice and, through that, demonstrate how network unavailable, instead of the commonsensical 'network available,' provides a context for discussion. This discussion gradually extends to concepts and questions related to such things as protectionism, censorship, transgression and resistance and through online/offline networks.

In what ways should we understand China and the network unavailable culture as

such? First of all, the GFW offers a geopolitical, infrastructural, and informational platform to identify cyber protectionism in China and in the global context. A network 'gateway' that started operations in 1998, it is considered as an 'alternative model' or a 'parallel universe' to that of the Internet. Thus metaphors used to describe the GFW of China is a 'wall,' a 'shield,' a 'sword' and a 'war' in itself (Griffith, 2019). The aforementioned analogy by James Griffith (2019) outlines the competitiveness, if not counterfeit nature, of the GFW of China. As an 'alternative' web model, China has its own search engine (*Baidu* instead of Google), social media and messaging apps (*Weibo* and *Wechat* instead of Facebook and WhatsApp), its own e-commerce mobile platform (*Alipay*), its own Uber (*Didi*) and many more. These 'common' websites and apps, such as Google, Facebook, Uber, and WhatsApp and more recently Wikipedia (since April 2020) are also blocked in China.

The parallel/alternative universe analogy is evident by how a Chinese version of global networks is created, operated, and functioned similar to an earlier Eurocentric model of information and ideology. It shows that no matter how much a Chinese version wants to depart from the World Wide Web, it inevitably sprung from there. At the beginning of this essay, I cited a passage from Taiwanese cultural studies scholar Chen Kuan-Hsing in *Asia as Method: Towards Deimperialization*. In this passage, Chen argues that the 'post-colonial enterprise' is always undermined by colonial history without critical examination, which could can also relate be situated in the discussion of network culture studies (Chen 2). The 'alternative' Internet in China requires close and critical examination of why and how such network operativity is drawn on the very idea of disconnection from the global network, despite being heavily influenced by it.

To continue this line of thought, the Great Firewall of China is hence constructed through how the Chinese government invents an information technology network that is built against the notion of openness and liberation of information. The GFW withdraws and blocks globally recognized information and services and in itself is a defense mechanism, and through that, to construct a state machine and algorithmic-ideological apparatus that allows censorship of information. For example, search engines in China filter anti-government and anti-CCP information in the name of proper governance, civil or cyber protectionism, and cyber nationalism. Such a defense mechanism through censorship extends to social control. According to research by Repnikova and Fang (2018), netizens in China 'co-produce' political persuasion that favours the communist regime in the online sphere through official state online media, expansion of government *Weibo* and *WeChat* accounts, and through grassroots patriotic bloggers in the name of civilizing information management and as 'authoritarian participatory digital persuasion 2.0' (Repnikova and Fang, 2018). The incorporation, or precisely the *détournement*, of the state and authoritarian propaganda model and through grassroots expression and disinformation has its strong presence in the platform politics of China. The practice of disinformation in contemporary China will further illustrate how network, platform, and censorship become an algorithmic-ideological apparatus. Fake news in China is either prohibited or censored by the Golden Shield Project (also known as the National Public Security Work Informational Project) or even created by the Project itself. The Internet meme of Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Winnie the Pooh which is banned in China without doubt illustrates this idea. The WeChatSCOPE (https://wechatscope.jmsc.hku.hk), an online database and research project developed by

the Journalism and Media Studies Centre at the University of Hong Kong, monitors selected WeChat public accounts and detects 'removed' contents.[2] A scholarly database that allows citizen and researchers to search and visualize censored content in China, the WeChatSCOPE project, however, does experience 'error' and 'failed to start' messages from time to time. Is it a technical faulty or is it being blocked? The concept of 'fake news' in China further elaborates and contests how the West considers 'fake news'. In China refers to 'fake news' points to news and disinformation that is neither approved by nor favorable to the Chinese government. Interestingly, fake news that is favorable to the CCP could be widely circulated, as state propaganda. Recently, how the Chinese government re-routes COVID-19 news is a vivid example. The prohibition of politically sensitive content and economic protectionism addresses the political economy of network culture in China. Network availability is a political-economical decision and expression. I argue that the network culture of withdrawal, exclusion, and blocking in China reinforces layers of 'network unavailability' in everyday life: assuming the network itself is a utopia of the free circulation of information, however network culture in China is operated through withdrawal, blocking, and exclusion of information under the state's control and censorship. However, practice of alternative browsing and access to the Internet beyond the Great Firewall does exist, for example the infamous *Fanqiang* (to literally "go over the wall"), despite being an illegal activity in China. The practice of *Fanqiang* could be seen as a tactic of resistance that further problematizes nationalism and network culture in China.

On a global scale, as a closed national network system itself and operated in parallel to the Internet, the Great Firewall of China demonstrates a decentralized and 'autonomous' network model, that operates and counteracts. I am not praising the GFW, nor am I advocating manipulation of disinformation and state censorship of information on a global scale. Rather, a different, if not an alternative and decolonized, information technology model should be recognized. A previous non-Chinese model and its development before the Internet, for instance the French Minitel terminal project (1980-2012), which has largely been unacknowledged in the discussion of network culture. The Minitel project not only provides a critical example to supplement the history and knowledge of a nationalized and 'pre-history' information technological platform, but also demonstrates how nationalism instructs and influences a network model (Mailland and Driscoll 2017). The Great Firewall of China is not the only national network in the global arena, other totalitarian regimes have their own, for instance, North Korea operates the Kwangmyong network, a national intranet and a browser, Naenara (http://naenara.com.kp) that can be accessed outside North Korea. These are networks of political economy, economic protectionism, and cyber nationalism: networks that are not made to make information available to all, but to serve the cause of national interest. Cyber nationalism operates on a language level; for instance, it is not easily accessible to browse and search information from Japan or Russia if one does not know Japanese or Russian. The universality of computational language (considered to be English) needs to be questioned in the discussion of network culture. Both the Great Firewall of China and the Kwangmyong network are rather extreme illustrations of cyber nationalism, yet they are also rather powerful examples from the decolonization of technology perspective.

However, we should not reduce our understanding of Chinese network culture as being merely a closed network system

according to the notion of nation-state and geographical/informational territories. As Benjamin Bratton points out regarding the Sino-Google conflicts in the essay "The Black Stack" (2014), China is also involved in the global network infrastructure, for example in the platform of the cloud as a stack (Bratton, 2014). Recently Chinese 5G network equipment provider Huawei's proposal to build mobile network infrastructure is being repudiated and replaced in the UK, Canada, and many other countries. This is for political-economic reasons rather than being solely a network-technological decision. The cloud, the layer, the user, and the network infrastructure are no longer defined by geographical sovereignty and the nation-state. The globality of network culture is evident when we look at the operational aspect and the black box politics of such. And yet, the Great Firewall, Kwangmyong, the deep web, the dark web, all these microcosms outlines and questions the assumption, integration, and interconnectedness of one widely available network. The utopic vision of interconnectedness of a network should be called into question, as the commonly known available network is only the tip of an (network) iceberg.

After this discussion of macrocosm and the infrastructure, we now return to the argument of 'network unavailable' to layers of the experience at the microscopic level. Firstly, I am going to focus on an artistic practice from China to start the discussion. At the China Pavilion, Venice Biennale 2019, media artist Fei Jun's interactive installation *Interesting World* (2019) exhibits the performativity of the network culture of China that could only be achieved by an offline system. Interesting World is a set of media projections operated by a presumably offline and 'faux' face-recognition technology. The installation brings visitors to a simulated image surveillance environment mimicking that is pervasive in contemporary China. There is an estimated that over 200 million surveillance cameras have been installed in China to aid in 'policing' the Social Credit system. The curatorial title Ruizhi (intelligence) may also describe China's ambition to develop artificial intelligence, and technology in the arts and everyday life, as well as the formation, building and social-engineering of a smart city. This artwork is a snapshot of the image surveillance economy in China.

Fei Jun's work as an example of an image surveillance environment, can be explained as two conceptual layers: through identification and through experiencing the system. A camera captures visitors who approach the lens media projections in real-time. The artificial intelligence programme identified a handful of prescribed identities of the visitors, in rather limited keywords and categories (Fig. 1). I was identified as a 'dancing-master' because of my body movement, even though I am not good at dancing. Two other 'dancing masters' were also identified. Identification is also performed through a colour-coding system: an old man, a tourist, a Floridian, a couple as 'kin,' a shoulder bag and an evening bag. These categories could be understood precisely as context-specific keywords, with biennale visitors inevitably falling into some of the categories based on prediction, rather than identification. The 'identification' was constantly mutating and ever shifting. A moment afterwards more categories were identified: a guard, a Japanese, an instigator, a gal, a grandfather, a saunterer, and a clutch bag.

Questions arise. Is *Interesting World* a functional and activated face recognition system? Is it a live recording for image data mining? What was the database of the prescribed identity and categories? Are we, the visitors, being watched, data-mined, analysed, and archived? (Was there a consent form available to sign and agree

Figure 1: Fei Jun's *Interesting World* at the China Pavilion, Venice Biennale 2019.

to before participating in this work?)[3] Or is it just an offline façade to demonstrate China's world power in imaging technology, artificial intelligence, and state's surveillance in a major world visual arts exposition? Unlike the state surveillance system in China or any in other geopolitical configuration, visitors stand in front of and experience the two sides of image technology: the capturing, by a surveillance camera and the analytics, through the visualization (such as color-coding, keywords, categories, and identities). The experience is produced by a choreographed and performative act of artificial intelligence to demonstrate China's place in world power relations; and at the back end of the work, perhaps, there is no database, no network, or network unavailable.

Fei Jun's *Interesting World* at the Venice Biennale 2019 provides a critical narrative to examine the performativity aspect of net art. Net art resides, substantiates, and exhibits on or through the network. A presumably offline network may not give permission to constitute how a network is created and responded in an artistic practice. Rather, *Interesting World* performs network culture in China as a matter of image surveillance, body and gestural identification, and social monitoring and engineering that are of national interest and identity: therefore, it makes perfect sense to exhibit this work in a national pavilion in a major contemporary art world exposition. The work is a performance of cyber nationalism and the political economy of technology in China rather than facilitating and executing performativity of net art. The unavailable network demonstrated here describes technological backwardness merely through displaying rather than executing. Technological backwardness, intriguingly, could be considered as a postcolonial tactic. Disconnecting the network so as to perform and operate similarly to a network are tactical tools to contextualize this work in the discussion of network culture and contemporary arts in China. It is a statement of 'intelligence' and ambition, even though it may not be working at all.

This essay will summarize the notion of unavailable network as it pertains to the political aspect of everyday life in Chinese

network culture. Let's take Hong Kong 2019 protest and the flow of information involved as an example. Protester's communication and grassroots propaganda of the Hong Kong 2019 protest relies heavily on network technology. We see, read, and produce pro-democratic persuasive statements, be they textual, visual or temporal, on social media. However, censorship of information by authoritarian government does occur as responses to the rise of digital activism. The censorship tactics here does not only refer to the filtering and banning of online information but an assumption to shut down the Internet silence public opinion and pro-democratic demand. For example, the messaging app Telegram has been widely used by citizens and protesters in Hong Kong to communicate, and yet the app and certain pro-democratic chat groups had also received massive cyber-attacks during the yearlong protest. Citizens and protesters have also communicated via a peer-to-peer network to avoid state surveillance from the government authority and an anticipated Internet shutdown.

A particular type of Internet meme is created that is operated and circulated via peer-to-peer network and targeted to reach those who may spend their time mostly offline and who perhaps are apolitical. For example, the 'elderly meme', as the name suggests, is a type of Internet meme that is popular amongst senior citizens in the Chinese context and originally may not be made and meant for political persuasion. Its image-stylistics, often involving the juxtaposition of Buddhist symbols, icons, and text, characterizes itself as an image apparatus that disconnects from the network and the discourse of social and digital activism.[4] During Hong Kong's Anti-Extradition Bill Protest in 2019, the elderly meme becomes spreadable and popular. This kind of meme also highlights how the use of peer-to-peer network works in the public sphere at a critical moment when no public network is available. Elderly memes involving pro-democratic messages to the Hong Kong's government and Chinese Communist Party is sent through airdrop (via Bluetooth) that iPhone users can choose to accept (or decline) in the public domain. Intriguingly, however, Android users seems to be excluded from such an alternative network model. Notwithstanding, the elderly meme establishes the process of decentralization of disseminating images and information. An alternative 'propagandist network' is created because of the fear of unavailable network (Fig. 2).

www.lihkg.com, a web-based Bulletin Board System (BBS)/forum, which could be considered a Hong Kong version of Reddit, is the platform of information dissemination amongst the protesters during the Anti-Extradition Bill Protest in Hong Kong. However, for many occasions during the 2019 protest many BBS platforms in Hong Kong were bombarded with Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks that temporarily terminated communication between the protesters for a short period of time until the gateway and service could come back online (Fig. 3). The fear of an inaccessible and unavailable network, that also implies and associates to fundamental Expression of Freedom and democracy amongst Hong Kong's citizen had been heightened. Livestream videos by photojournalists and citizen photojournalists were broadcast via social media platforms, such as Facebook and Instagram. However, the great number of reactions by viewers such as 'like,' 'love,' or 'angry,' for the broadcasted video would experience a time lag because of information overloading. Viewers' reactions can be made with just a click of the button, bandwidth was often limited. The temporality of the network, real-time viewing, and reaction are complex in the sense that it is not a linear progression but are many micro-networks *per se.*

Figure. 2: The Elderly Meme in Hong Kong, first generated and sent via Bluetooth then printed out and given post-digital existence.

Figure 3: The visualization of DDoS attack by the Digital Attack Map on the 1st July 2019.



Overloaded bandwidth was also not unusual at the protest site. With a mass amount of data traffic by protesters constantly checking chats, threads, maps, and video-streaming, the public Wi-Fi and the mobile data network were so overloaded that it could not. What Hong Kong protesters experienced during the yearlong protest are on the both edges of the Internet: networks that bring people and pro-democratic demands together; networks that may disappoint us because they could not function as the way it promised. The aforementioned examples of network behavior are linked to network unavailability as a way to control information. This not only reveals the public fear of network unavailability, but also the fatigue and fragility of any publicly available network.

What is the lesson learned from the 2019 protests in Hong Kong that is related to network culture? It could be referred to the naming of the protest itself: the water revolution. 'Be water' is a common saying amongst the protesters in Hong Kong. It originated from Bruce Lee's catchphrase "Be Water, My Friend" from the 1960s and 1970s Hong Kong that describes the capacity, volume, and strength of water in the Chinese Kung Fu manner. In 2019 the saying stressed the importance of fluidity, which is the exact opposite of the 2014 umbrella movement: solidity and occupying. Here, the water political metaphor is extended to describe the network. It aspires and advocates a formless and fluid network that is non-hierarchical by nature. Referencing the recent anti-totalitarian regime protest globally, the formless and shapeless network is explained through street-smart, decentralized, guerilla tactics. The notion of network, also, becomes a decision-making process rather than a social engineering structure. A pre-empt network formation is often top-down structure that facilitates managerialism and thus social control. What occurred in the Hong Kong protests of 2019 is the opposite way of thinking about networks; it is a tactical way of network forming that is based on decisions made in-situ, and is often ephemeral. The network would be dissolved once the situation is resolved by certain decisions made, and another network may evolve as another situation arises. The reason to introduce the water metaphor to conclude an essay on unavailable networks in China is explained through: (1) networks are political and geopolitical; (2) the advancement and universality of an available network could be a façade; and (3) the discussion of networks should go beyond mere structuralism and emphasize the everyday life, tactical, and microscopic decision-making process.

The aforementioned case studies, the Great Firewall and the Golden Shield, *Interesting World*, and the network happenings in the Hong Kong 2019 protest, illustrates certain phenomena of network unavailability such as provision, challenges, and resistance to the network culture in the contemporary Chinese context. Will China become an alternative 'democratic' network model as opposed to the Eurocentric and dominating Internet? It is dangerous to assert democracy is happening in the network culture in China. In the essay, I illustrate, and hence problematize what has been unacknowledged in the discussion of network culture by using China as an example. The China model serves as model of dialectical reasoning to critically rethink and reexamine global network culture through a post-colonial and technological decolonization gaze.

Throughout the 2019 Hong Kong protests the Hong Kong government advocated the imposition of the Emergency Regulations Ordinance (ERO) that would exercise regulation and control of information on the Internet that would include regulating or banning the Telegram messaging app and shutting down pro-democratic web-based forums such as

www.lihkg.com. The Emergency Regulations Ordinance, if exercised in the future, could be seen as the extension of and rerouting to the Great Firewall of China. The Ordinance itself is controversial and yet it hints at the end of freedom of expression, speech, and the flow of Information. The fake news incidents also suggest China's position in controlling and manipulating public opinion and information in the global arena. All this suggests a new China's model of unavailable network that seems distant and yet it is happening. In the course of writing, while the Sino-American relationship becomes more intense, the Chinese government has already taken action to introduce the National Security Law in Hong Kong that will immensely reshape the global dynamic of politics, economy, and information structure and practice in Hong Kong and beyond.

In May 2020, following the Executive Order on Preventing Online Censorship by the White House, social media tycoon Mark Zuckerberg was 'worried' that the Chinese model would be influence and replicated by 'other' countries, and he urged the Western countries to take the initiative and cooperation on Internet regulation "globally".[5] In the Pan-Asia context, the 'Remove China Apps', an mobile application that identifies and helps removing apps of Chinese origin developed by OneTouch AppLabs, an India-based startup company, received more than one million download when it was first launched in May 2020. The developmental trajectories of networks in the global arena is moving towards making networks unavailable, and the China example could be introduced as a reasoning for this, or the reason itself. The rival over the control of networks and information technology prevents, and also establishes, the network unavailable phenomenon by and large: of China and the West, the replica and the original, the powerful and the other powerful. Nationalism and netionalism are inevitably connected. The utopic globalism of information (without borders) is in danger. Globalization was a promise to humankind in the twentieth Century. Globalization without deimperialization is hypocritical, as Chen argues at the very beginning of the essay. What we are facing in the twenty-first century, however, is a dialectics of disguise and reproduction. If China is the future, dare I ask, would the China model otherwise have the potential to influence post-globalized information structure? Will 'network unavailable', state authoritarianism, and protectionism be an inevitable network future?

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Notes

[1] "Top 20 Countries with the Highest Number of Internet Users." Internet World Stats, 2019. https://www.internetworldstats.com/top20.htm/. Accessed 10 April 2020.

[2] "WeChatSCOPE: an insight to censorship in China." Journalism and Media Studies Centre, The University of Hong Kong, 2018. https://wechatscope.jmsc.hku.hk. Accessed 10 April 2020

[3] The question seems unnecessary but Shu-Lea Cheang, a media artist who represents Taiwan in the Venice Biennale 2019, also has her take on surveillance and technology at Palazzo delle Prigioni, a former Venetian prison. Before visitors walking into the site-specific installation work, a privacy policy in accordance to the EU regulation with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data is shown to the visitor.

[4] Please refer to the Elderly Meme Generator. http://files.rei.idv.tw/thumb/older.html. Accessed 10 April 2020.

[5] For details of the Executive Order from the White House, please see https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-preventing-online-censorship/. Accessed 5 June 2020.

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